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The Metamorphosis of Social Movements into Political Parties. The 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian al-Nahda as Cases for a 
Reflection on Party Institutionalisation Theory 
 
Abstract 
The article studies newly established parties with roots in social movements. Using the 
post-Spring development of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisian al-Nahda as 
in-depth empirical cases, the study reflects on prevalent theoretical explanations for the 
transitions of social movements into political parties. The article argues that extant 
literature on party system institutionalisation and on the development of social 
movement do not adequately explain the driving factors for the transition process of 
movements into parties. A focus on party systems does not take note of the dynamics of 
movement-party relations, while social movement theory remains steeped in 
conceptions of institutional evolution and ‘natural progression’ in politics. When 
rethinking party institutionalisation, it needs to be recognised that it is a precarious 
process during which features of social movement activism overlap with the formalised 
engagement that characterises political parties. The comparative study of the Muslim 
Brotherhood-led Freedom and Justice Party and the Tunisian al-Nahda Movement and 
its al-Nahda Party exemplifies that the degree to which leading parties emancipate 
themselves from the guardianship of their ‘mother-organisations’ is an essential factor 
for democratic state-building.  
Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood; al-Nahda; party institutionalisation; social 
movements; parties  
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The Metamorphosis of Social Movements into Political Parties. The 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian al-Nahda as Cases for a 
Reflection on Party Institutionalisation  
Introduction 
There is little hope for democratisation in the Middle East today. The venture known as the 
Arab Spring has largely failed. Egypt has reinstated an authoritarian presidential regime led 
by President ‘Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi, one that is – regarding its system of governance –  not 
dissimilar to that of President Hosni Mubarak, albeit one that practices more severe levels of 
repression to crush any opposition. Other states – Libya, Yemen and Syria - are embattled in 
civil war, relegating hopes of democratic change to a distant memory. Perhaps Tunisia is the 
one remarkable exception, as it, despite many setbacks and grave challenges, remains on the 
path of democratic state-building.  
The contrast between the Egyptian and the Tunisian situation inspires this article. These 
country cases have been the focus of insightful research which takes three main directions: 
firstly, enquiries of institutional factors (Bellin, 2011; Albrecht, 2015); secondly, 
investigations into the strategic behaviour of main protagonists of change (Tadroz, 2018; 
Albrecht & Bishara, 2011; Abdelrahman, 2015) and, finally, studies of ideological 
trajectories (Zollner, 2018; Cavatorta, 2018). This set of literature gives significant insight 
into the political paths of both countries; yet, beyond these contributions, this article poses the 
thesis that the metamorphosis of social movements into political parties took different 
trajectories in each case. It is this divergence that explains the failure of democracy-building 
in the Egyptian case, and its relative success in the Tunisian example. The article thus adds to 
existing research, which sets out persuasive arguments that informal networks and social 
movement organisations played a crucial part in ousting long-lasting authoritarian regimes in 
the MENA region. Amongst these are studies that compare phases of democratic mobilisation 
by drawing parallels to other incidences of sudden political change (della Porta, 2014), those 
which specifically look at the histories of political protest in the Middle East (Chalcraft, 
2016; Abdelrahman, 2015), and contributions which aim to contextualise the protests of 2011 
(Gerges, Fawaz A., 2015). While these works specifically focus on the role of social 
movements as protagonists for challenging authoritarian regimes in the region, there is 
nevertheless little research on their role in post-revolutionary
*
 democracy-building and even 
less on the transition of social movements into political parties during this phase.  
The few studies that do take a closer look at the role of parties in post-revolutionary Egypt 
and Tunisia predominantly adopt a structural position, one which is dominated by theories on 
party system institutionalisation. This perspective assumes a priori that political parties are 
guarantors of an evolving democratic system of governance and that democratic pluralism 
and party competition are signifiers of democratic state-building. However, parties have first 
to undergo a process of formation, self-definition and institutionalisation before they become 
the bearers of democratic values. Granted, while the notion of a genuinely independent party 
that epitomises democratic values might be just an ideal, the critical point here is that most 
new parties in evolving democracies develop out of social movements. Party system 
perspectives overlook this crucial point and therefore, as we will see, present us with an 
                                                            
*
 I refer to ‘revolution’ in the popular use of the term, but do not further engage with the debate whether the 
political change of 2011 in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia constitute indeed a ‘revolution’ in terms of 
political science. 
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incomplete and sometimes misleading picture of democratic state-building. In contrast to the 
prevailing party system perspective, this article follows the work of Randall and Svåsand as 
and also Basedau and Stroh who emphasise the importance of party institutionalisation 
(Basedau & Stroh, 2008; Randall & Svåsand, 2002).  It considers, so Basedau and Stroh 
‘…the process in which individual political parties that participate in elections experience an 
increase in organisational stability and value’ (Basedau & Stroh, 2008, p. 2)  
The Egyptian and Tunisian cases provide us with rich empirical material for theory-building 
on the development of parties. In both counties, social movements were central to ousting 
authoritarian leaders; moreover, in both examples, core movements transitioned into political 
parties. Also, Islamist movements and their parties were leading actors in efforts to build new 
state/political institutions. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) with its Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP) and the al-Nahda Movement (NM) with its al-Nahda Party (NP) will, therefore, be the 
primary focus of the empirical part of this discussion. It is remarkable that two organisations 
with similar religious-political frames that are rooted in ‘Ikhwani’ ideas and, because they are 
Islamists, stem from same social movement family, are so dissimilar in their transitions into 
political parties. It is this fact which leads us to hypothesise that there is a relationship 
between the transformation of social movement organisations into political parties, on the one 
hand, and the success/failure of democratic development, on the other hand.  
The contribution of this article is to focus on the development of social movements into 
political parties during this process, thus aiming to answer the following questions: What are 
the terms and conditions that propel organisations that were part of the politics of contention 
to re-invent themselves as the representative body of a new political system? What are the 
subtleties that drive social movements towards formalising their political activities? This 
article follows the suggestion of Basedau and Stroh that the infusion of democratic values 
and, herein, particularly the aspect of party autonomy, is an important element for the 
development of democratic parties (Basedau & Stroh, 2008, pp. 7-10). Democratic values can 
only be expressed if new political parties do not act as the political arm of social movement 
organisations, but instead become autonomous from their social movement roots. The case of 
the Tunisian NP evidences this; its process of institutionalisation as a political party started 
well before the Jasmine Revolution; compared to the FJP, this was pursued more stringently 
and progressed much further. In contrast, the example of the Egyptian MB shows that the FJP 
remained an extended arm of the ‘mother-organisation’, acting merely as its political branch 
rather than as an independent party.  
 
Party System Perspective: A Useful Approach?  
Considerable theoretical research exists on structural aspects of forming new political 
institutions and legal frameworks during democratic transition. Without taking account of the 
fact that most political parties in post-authoritarian settings evolve out of social movements, 
party system institutionalisation is the dominant approach to the study of democratic state-
building. As such, party competition in free post-authoritarian elections is an indicator of the 
progression towards democratic governance. This approach takes a structural view which 
regards party competition as a fundamental element of the democratic process. Dahl’s 
Polyarchy has given impetus to this debate, arguing that the major characteristic of successful 
democratic transition processes lies in the proliferation of parties and their consolidation 
within the political system (Dahl, 1971, pp. 1-47). As his emphasis regarding post-
authoritarian transition is on party-pluralism within a system of governance, he overlooks the 
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impact of social movements in democratic transition processes. Following in Dahl’s 
footsteps,  O’Donnell and Schmitter point out that elections generate a ‘contingent consent’. 
Parties and politicians, which they see as the actual holders of power, agree on the procedural 
norms of the electoral process (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pp. 59-61; Schmitter & Carl, 
1991, pp. 82-83). Along those lines, analysts who commented on the post-Arab Spring 
elections in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011 looked at the spectrum of parties, seeing the emergent 
pluralism as evidence of change (Tavana, 2013, pp. 51-61; Pickard, 2013, pp. 133-148). As 
such, the freedom to form parties, irrespective of whether these have Islamist, nationalist, 
socialist or liberal leniencies, was regarded as part and parcel of an evolving open and 
pluralistic party spectrum.  
Granted, the party system approach provides us with a useful macro-perspective of the party 
spectrum and a valuable assessment of elections. In the case of Egypt, numerous political 
parties were formed or gained legal recognition in 2011. According to the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, over 80 parties were created across the political 
spectrum; at least 50 of these were non-Islamist (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2014). The Tunisian case shows a similar explosion of new political parties. 110 new 
parties were registered during 2011. In the first post-authoritarian election to the Constituent 
Assembly, 81 different political parties and many more independent candidates competed for 
seats (Bollier, 2011). As in Egypt, most new parties were secular, ranging from nationalists 
and liberals to socialists. The elections show that in both countries the secular camp was 
fragmented and thus paved the way for the victory of Islamist parties. In Tunisia, NP 
galvanised parts of the electorate through its appearance of unity. NP thus became the largest 
single party in the election of the Constituent Assembly in October 2011 with 37.04% of the 
overall votes, thus securing 89 of 217 assembly seats. In Egypt, the MB’s FJP emerged as the 
largest political party with 37.5% of votes, thus ensuring 235 seats (including 22 seats of 
parties which were part of the Democratic Alliance); the second largest party was al-Nour 
Party which won 27.8%. In all, Islamist parties became a leading political force in both 
countries.   
If one assesses the Egyptian and Tunisian cases purely by the range of parties which 
competed in the first election, it would be reasonable to deduce that Egypt and Tunisia were 
well on their way to establishing democratic pluralism. It would confirm Dahl’s views on 
party pluralism and contestation or O’Donnell and Schmitter’s concept of ‘contingent 
consent’ (Dahl, 1971, pp. 1-16; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pp. 59-61). After all, the 
legalisation of many parties in both countries during 2011/12 introduced party pluralism, and 
the elections to national legislatures in both states could be regarded as a sign of free political 
contestation. A party system perspective cannot, however, explain the subsequent divergent 
political trajectories of the Egyptian and the Tunisian cases, one which is marked by 
democratic failure and the other by a tentative success. The fact that Egypt, despite its 
seemingly promising electoral landscape and its electoral optimism, abruptly abandoned its 
process of democratic transition, clearly challenges the thesis that the primary evidence for 
democratic state-building lies in party-pluralism and the fair competition of parties in the first 
free elections.  
Setting aside the value-laden debate about the relationship between Islamism and democracy, 
the fact needs to be taken into account that the majority of new parties in post-authoritarian 
settings have roots in social movement organisations. It throws up questions on why social 
movements take the path of institutionalisation to then re-configure as political parties. As 
this approach introduces a micro-perspective that requires researchers to pay close attention 
to processes that shape new parties, it is a departure from structural explanations that focus on 
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party system institutionalisation. As in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, it requires taking note 
of the institutionalisation of key-parties such as NP or the FJP with a particular eye on intra-
organisational developments. It is this micro-perspective which give us answers to why one 
became an agent of democracy-building while the other became a stumbling block to the 
democratic transition process. Social movements, at least those which formalise their political 
involvement to establish political parties, are themselves the subject of the complexities of 
political transformation. Crucially, this means that we need to recognise that the dynamics of 
building formal institutional representation run parallel to the formation of a new 
constitutional framework. Research on democratic state-building thus needs to differentiate 
between party system institutionalisation and party institutionalisation and, in turn, recognise 
that neither the numbers of new parties nor the building of new institutional framework is in 
itself a conclusive indicator for either the triumph or, indeed, for the potential collapse of 
democratisation.   
 
Party Institutionalisation: a Theoretical Conundrum 
In the case of post-Spring Egypt and Tunisia, two social movement organisations that formed 
political parties stand out, namely the MB and al-NM. The MB initiated the formation of the 
FJP and the Tunisian NM which was the basis for the subsequent NP. The fact that these are 
two Islamist organisations is of l ss relevance here, albeit it supports the comparability of 
both cases. The shared ideological frames of both organisations allow us to discount the 
argument that Islamist movements/parties per se are unable to engage in democratic 
processes and thus encourage us to search for alternative explanations. Of course, there 
remains much to be debated on the extent to which individual Islamist movements/parties 
embrace democratic values by incorporating liberal values that are usually associated with 
secular humanist perceptions – a discussion which is linked to the so-called ‘participation-
moderation’ thesis (Schwedler, 2011, pp. 347-376; Cavatorta & Merone, 2013, pp. 857-875). 
But beyond this related debate, it remains an undeniable fact that al-Nahda, the MB and their 
subsequent political parties had an enormous bearing on the evolving post-revolutionary 
landscape. Both organisations acted and reacted in distinct ways to the new opportunities and 
responsibilities that came with building a new political order. While Islamism can be 
discounted as having a causal impact on (the success or failure of) democratisation, the key to 
understanding the different trajectories of the MB and the NM lies in the in-depth exploration 
and comparison of these cases to then reflect on the link between democratic state-building 
and party institutionalisation.  
As will be shown in this section, presently conceived models and theoretical presuppositions 
on the process of institutionalisation do not adequately capture the dynamics and outcomes of 
the transition from social movement to political party. Neither the emphasis on the 
administrative effectiveness of the new party and, related to it, its efficacy within a new 
system, nor the postulation that parties are more adept in influencing state-building than 
social movements, are plausible explanations for the process of party institutionalisation. 
The term ‘institutionalisation’ is often used broadly to describe all kinds of dynamics related 
to social as well as political transformation and is usually linked to the implementation of 
more effective organisational structures and bureaucracies. This view of the process, which 
particularly focuses on internal structures and the administrative makeup, is epitomised by 
Huntington, who describes institutionalisation as ‘the process by which organisations and 
procedures acquire value and stability’ (Huntington, 1968, p. 12). Of course, his work is 
concerned with operational effectiveness and less with value-infusion as a dimension of 
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democratic parties (Basedau & Stroh, 2008, p. 8). It is this emphasis that relates Huntington’s 
work directly to analyses of party system institutionalisation. Because democratic state-
systems are more heterogeneous and pluralistic, it is implicitly asserted that movements 
require higher levels of organisation, discipline and structure, thus pushing them to acquire 
the format of political parties. State-structures are, following this logic, at the centre of the 
process with the assumption that the party systems to which these movements adapt are the 
causal drivers of the transformation from a movement to a party. This explanation of parties’ 
institutionalisation processes is a guiding thread in the works of Michels, Dahls or 
Huntington.  
The thesis that the adaptation to the political system drives the process of party 
institutionalisation shows, however, fundamental problems. In fact, this view does not make 
sense if one considers that an institutional framework has not yet been finalised. At the stage 
when the majority of parties gain their legal recognition, neither the party system nor the 
constitutional framework is settled. To illustrate this inevitable logical flaw that forms the 
basis of explanations related to party system perspectives, let us consider the Egyptian and 
Tunisian cases. In both instances, the sequence of events highlights that most social 
movements cum parties, amongst them the MB and NM, handed in their party platform 
applications in spring 2011, that is before substantial issues related to the system of 
governance were settled. In Egypt and Tunisia, negotiations about a constitutional format of a 
future political system followed only after the first pluralistic elections of 2011. Hence, the 
formation of the NP or the FJP cannot be the result of adaptation to an existing political 
system. The cases demonstrate that the process of transition from social movement to 
political party does not follow the development of a democratic system and, consequently, 
cannot be initiated by it.  
The concept of institutionalisation from movements into parties as brought forward by 
Huntington, Michels, but also by Tarrow and other prominent authors who inspired social 
movement theory, reveals another major caveat. It is related to the notion that parties are 
better organised and perhaps even on a higher evolutionary level of development. This thesis 
reminds one somewhat of scientific evolutionism. For example, Michels, whose work 
Political Parties influenced generations of researchers on party politics (Michels, 1962), 
suggests that these are the product of ‘natural’ development. It leads movements to adopt 
structures that enable them to progress to the sphere of formal politics. Describing non-
institutional forms of political participation as radical and anarchic, he contends that 
revolutionary features are eventually superseded by ‘oligarchic’ structures (Michels, 1962, 
pp. 342-356). He incorporates this position in his ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which indicates that 
a conservative trend is at play that ultimately ‘tames’ social movements. In sum, Michels 
equates institutionalisation with a natural progression towards adopting top-down leadership 
structures that ultimately pushes anarchic movements to reform internally and thus prepares 
these to assimilate into the political system. It is noteworthy also that he regards more 
conservative political positions and moderation as inevitable by-products of this 
development.  
Even if one disregards for now that ideas about evolution are problematic, the application of 
Michels’s iron law as the explanatory framework for the transition of the MB bears problems. 
For one, the MB constructed an oligarchic structure long before it committed to non-violence 
(Michell, 1993, pp. 163-183); moreover, the institutionalisation of bureaucratic structures 
occurred decades before voices about formulating a party-platform first appeared (Wickham, 
2013, pp. 76-95). As such, the MB’s highly developed administrative hierarchy, which is 
based on a stringent top-down line of command and a bottom-up selection process, makes the 
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organisation a flexible and efficient network.  It allows the organisation to operate as a mass-
organisation, while it manages to maintain its capacity as an organised political opposition 
that proves resilient to recurrent waves of persecution (Zollner, 2015, pp. 44-46). Michels’s 
theoretical suggestion of a sequence for institutionalisation processes is therefore not valid – 
at least not in this case. The assumption that there is sequence is however not the only reason 
why Michels’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ is flawed as his theory also gives no room for instances 
when a conservative, oligarchic tendency impedes party formation and party 
institutionalisation. In the case of the MB, reformist factions pushed for the creation of a 
party in 1996 and 2007, while the conservative oligarchic leadership in the Guidance Council 
resented this aim (Zollner, 2015, p. 52).  
Beyond this, the burden of evolutionism looms over Michels’s work. Although more recent 
political science discourses often reject the idea of ‘natural’ progression as an outdated 
concept, it comes as a surprise that debates about party institutionalisation still hold on to this 
notion. For example, Tarrow, as one of the grandmasters of social movement theory, assumes 
that there is a ‘natural’ drive behind the transition from movement to party. He puts the 
process down to bureaucratisation (Tarrow, 1994, pp. 215-232), thus following a rationale 
that reminds of Weber. According to Tarrow, organisational and administrative shifts within 
social movements aid their adaption to changes in ideational frameworks. While he remains 
unclear on the finer details of the dynamics, he takes up the concept of rationalisation to 
argue that it sets social movements on the path towards institutionalisation into political 
parties. This process seems to be underwritten by the assumption that the process is 
unstoppable and linear, driven by the conjecture that parties have a more evolved practice of 
influencing political life. To him, access to formalised platforms and institutions gives 
bureaucratically evolved organisations the opportunity to express political positions fully 
(Tarrow, 1994, pp. 215-232). The problem with Tarrow’s explanation is that organisations’ 
histories are interpreted retrospectively, making the theoretical model hard to contest. As 
such, one could indeed argue that there is a linear development from the charismatic 
leadership of Hasan al-Banna to then reach its zenith as a political party in 2011 with the 
establishment of the FJP. However, the case of al-Nahda does not fit quite as neatly into this 
schema, unless one is willing to amalgamate the leadership of Rashid al-Gannoushi with the 
bureaucratisation process itself.  
Offe objects to Michels and Tarrow, arguing that the progression from social movements to 
political parties is not inevitable (Offe, 1990). Dealing with the case of the Green Party in 
Germany, his study has fundamental transferable theoretical implications. His argument is 
twofold. For one, he illustrates that, despite the ‘temptations’ of formal politics, some 
movements deliberately opt to engage in informal politics (Offe, 1990, pp. 241-247). In the 
Egyptian and Tunisian cases, there were plenty of social movements, some with an immense 
capacity to mobilise people and significant levels of bureaucratisation, that nonetheless did 
not take a step towards institutionalising as a political party. Secondly, Offe recognises that 
the process of institutionalisation is usually far from smooth. The study thus encourages to 
scrutinise intra-organisational dynamics and offers a way to explain tensions between various 
factions within the movement and the evolving party. In the case of the MB, one can see that 
tensions between reformists and orthodoxy simmered over the formation of a party for more 
than a decade before the Arab Spring (Wickham, 2013, pp. 76-119; Zollner, 2015, pp. 52-53). 
The establishment of the FJP was by no means an inevitable outcome, let alone smooth 
process.  What makes Offe’s otherwise convincing study objectionable is that he re-
introduces the concept of an ‘evolutionary’ progression (Offe, 1990, p. 240) through the 
back-door. He holds on to the view that a progressive development is at play when a 
movement chooses to develop into a party, but he takes this position a step further, 
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suggesting a sequence of stages that social movements have to pass through along the path to 
institutionalisation from inception as a protest group to full potential as a party.  
For the same reasons as stated above, Offe’s argument that there is a sequential progression is 
questionable. Like Michels, Offe also relates institutionalisation to the development of intra-
organisational hierarchies and clear administrative structures. The MB and the NM are 
counter-cases. The MB had developed lines of command and executive order long before the 
FJP was established. In fact, the MB showed a more evolved degree of bureaucratisation than 
most established political parties in Egypt, including iconic parties such as the nationalist 
Wafd Party. NM in pre-revolutionary Tunisia had also established clear bureaucratic order, 
with the slight difference that the movement was operating more like a party than a broad 
social movement. Unlike the MB in Egypt, which regarded welfare provisions, religious 
training and broader social transformation as part of its remit, NM placed more emphasis on 
its political aim and, accordingly, used civil society platforms as its main stage (Murphsy, 
2011, pp. 299-305; Haugbølle & Cavatorta, 2011, pp. 323-341). The above examples show 
that the concept of institutionalisation from movement to party hardly reflects the degree to 
which organisations are efficiently structured; if anything, the high degree of 
bureaucratisation in the case of the MB hindered its development into an independent 
political party. However, the works of Tarrow and Offe seem to make exactly this inference 
by relating the concept to evolutionary progression.  
Institutionalisation is furthermore not directly linked to the capacity to influence public policy 
or political decisions. Whether it be Huntington, Michels, Tarrow or the theories they 
influenced, there is a widespread assumption that parties have more political clout than social 
movements and that this constitutes the driving force for the process of institutionalisation 
from movement to party.  What, however, is the evidence for this view? If this position is 
correct, it would be logical that the majority of social movements, particularly the most 
influential and best organised of them, rush to become political parties. Of course, there is 
undeniable evidence of the surge in the number of new parties in the early phase of 
democratic transition. The Egyptian and Tunisian cases show a sharp increase of party 
licence applications in 2011, which seems to have peaked in the weeks before the first 
elections (High Judicial Elections Commission, 2011). The number of new registrations 
declined after the first elections, indicating that, once the playing field is established, there is 
less appeal to formalise the transition into a party. Ergo, the trigger for institutionalisation lies 
not so much in the openness of a political system, but rather in the potential for influencing 
political life. Further evidence here is the fact that many social movements, whether in Egypt, 
Tunisia or in other states that are subject to democratic state-building, do not attempt to 
‘institutionalise’ their activities and hence do not move on to become political parties.  
The data on post-Spring Egypt is overwhelming. Key-movements, particularly on the secular-
left side of the spectrum and those with a self-declared post-ideological stance, remained 
active as protest movements. Noteworthy examples are the April 6 Movement and the wider 
egalitarian Tahrir Youth Movement, the so-called Shabab al-Tahrir, but also later the 
Tamarrod Movement. Many of these movements pursued a vision of direct democracy and 
largely rejected the notion that democratisation requires movements to adapt to an 
institutional structure. For them, the institutional structure epitomised an elitist and corrupt 
system. Hence, they deliberately limited their activism to the informal political sphere, 
pursuing a radical vision of perpetual revolution and declining to transition into a party. 
Despite this, these movements were able to sustain the mobilisation of large numbers of 
protesters to join in demonstrations. The examples show that there is not an immediate 
correlation between political opportunity and the capacity to exert political power.    
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In fact, we should not assume that parties have more political clout than movements, 
particularly during periods of democratic transitions. The events of the spring and summer of 
2013 in Egypt, which ultimately led to the removal of President Muhammad Mursi, show that 
social movements such as the anti-Mursi Tamarrod Movement can exert immense pressure 
on a political framework that is still fragile (Elyacher, 2014, pp. 452-471). The mobilisation 
against the Mursi government also shows that parties, particularly those that were less 
successful in the 2011 election, opted to align themselves with anti-MB movements. In some 
cases, political parties regressed and deliberately broke the ‘contingent consent’ to vocally 
support anti-MB social movements. It was the case with the Free Egyptians Party and the 
Reform and Development Party or the Tagammu‘, the Popular Socialist Alliance and the 
Egyptian Socialist Democratic Party. Marginalised by formal politics, these parties opted to 
realign themselves with social movements and, in fact, encouraged the mobilisation of anti-
Mursi protests rather than aiming for a new electoral contest through formal channels. 
These observations challenge assumptions on institutionalisation on several levels. The 
examples indicate that pro-democracy movements may rather opt to operate as informal 
political actors, thus avoiding the electoral political contest altogether and, in addition, that 
parties may reverse their commitment to formal politics by realigning with social movements 
if it is advantageous for them to do so. Thus, the argument that it is the prospect of 
developing a formal democratic framework which encourages the transition of movements 
into parties, as suggested by Tarrow, cannot be correct; rather party institutionalisation is 
driven by the prospect of having an immediate political impact. Indeed, the appeal of entering 
parliament or the opportunity to participate in the constitution-writing assembly is a pull 
factor, as these platforms offer pathways to instantaneous influence. If opportunities are 
restrained, it stalls the development of new parties and might even signal the return of social 
movement power. Moreover, even if social movements evolve into parties, they do not 
necessarily adopt conservative tendencies and oligarchic structures. It puts in doubt Michels’s 
thesis that institutionalisation, conservatism and moderation are interlinked (Michels, 1962, 
pp. 163-183). In fact, there is little evidence that social movements that transition into parties 
give up their commitment to radical political change, at least not as long as the political 
system is unsettled. Thus, the Arab Spring gives credibility to Bermeo’s position that social 
movements do not necessarily moderate during democratic transitions (Bermeo, 1999, pp. 
120-140). In fact, the Egyptian case shows that social movements and new political parties 
might continue to pursue their radical vision. Paradoxically, this might destabilise the 
democratisation process, even if the parties or movements regard their vision as radically pro-
democratic.   
 
Why Are Boundaries Important?  Or, Why Are Social Movements Distinct from 
Parties? 
The above section demonstrates that existing theories on party formation are highly flawed. 
Explanations which correspond the process to the state system or which assume that the 
institutionalisation of parties is directly or indirectly linked to the development of 
bureaucratic lines of command, seem to overlook the obvious. While all aspects of political 
life are in fluctuation during the time of post-revolutionary state-building, organisations 
within this framework are also not fully formed entities. Relatively fixed coefficients seem to 
be the features attributed to either social movement or political parties. In fact, party 
institutionalisation could be defined as the process during which a social movement modifies 
to such an extent that it sheds its appearance as an informal political actor to become a 
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political party. There is thus the assumption that there are characteristics which set the 
boundaries between social movement organisations and political parties.  
Most ‘classics’ on social movements, amongst them Tilly; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald; 
and Diani highlight that the distinguishing element between a party and a social movement is 
related to where it operates: either in the formal or informal political sphere. Standard 
definitions of social movements emphasise that these act in opposition to the state and that 
they pursue their contentious politics through informal platforms which lie outside the control 
of the state-system (McAdam, Doug; McCarthy, John D.; Zald, Mayer N., 1996, pp. 7-12; 
della Porta, Donnatella; Diani, Mario, 2006, pp. 20-23). Most authors regard as elemental 
features of parties that they compete in the electoral contest, thus aiming for a nomination to 
act as the representative of the will of the people; this commitment to democratic practice is 
also reflected in their organisational set-up which, at least in theory, should have a democratic 
makeup. There is then a basic accord that political parties can be identified in this way 
through their constitutional framework and intra-organisational democratic processes.  
More recent studies on political parties and social movements question the consent that these 
two entities are distinct from each other. For example, Chambers regards a political party ‘as 
a relatively durable social formation which seeks offices or power in government, exhibits a 
structure or organization which links leaders at the centres of government to a significant 
popular following in the political arena and its local enclaves, and generates in-group 
perspectives or at least symbols of identification or loyalty’. His view indicates that parties 
are the midpoint between formal politics and informal grass-roots activism (Chambers, 1967, 
p. 5).  While Chambers deduces this position from studying American parties, there is also a 
growing trend within Social Movement Theory that regards the boundaries between social 
movements and political parties as somewhat fluid. Goldstone is a leading proponent of this 
thesis; he emphasises the lack of clear delineation, arguing that the dividing lines are loose, 
permeable and indeed ‘fuzzy’ (Goldstone, 2003, pp. 1-26). He also suggests that parties and 
movements have overlapping aims -- both are determined to influence politics. According to 
Goldstone, it is therefore difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between informal and 
formal politics, particularly in instances where social movements and political parties work 
together to achieve their goals. Although he focuses mainly on the inter-relationship between 
social movements and parties in established democracies, he goes on to emphasise that the 
distinction between the two is even more obscure during processes of democratisation 
(Goldstone, 2003, pp. 1-26).  
Research from post-communist Eastern European and the South-East Asian context supports 
Goldstone’s thesis (Desai, 2003, pp. 170-196; Glenn, 2003, pp. 147-169). The Egyptian and 
Tunisian cases also confirm that many parties act more like extensions of social movements 
than independent representatives of a voting constituency. Of course, the overlay is not based 
on conjoined structural elements; parties have constitutions, executive and legislative 
structures, all of which should ensure that they are independent bodies which are externally 
and internally guided by democratic principles. Democratic party constitutions were also the 
fundamental requirement for the legalisation process of parties in Tunisia and Egypt (Harakat 
al-Nahda, 2011; Freedom and Justice Party, 2011).  Looking at the FJP in more detail, the 
constitution states that members of the Party Leadership Council and Executive Committee 
are elected by the party’s General Assembly (Freedom and Justice Party, 2011; Egyptian 
Elections Watch, 2011). FJP leaders also had to relinquish seats in the Brotherhood’s 
Guidance Council, Shura Council or any other ‘official’ body of the mother-organisation. 
Outwardly then, the FJP fitted the profile of a democratic and independent party. Thus, at 
least in legal terms, the FJP was autonomous from the internal structures and the nomination 
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processes of the MB. Notwithstanding this, new parties are often inseparably linked to social 
movements – some more deeply than others.  
Parties are often influenced by the ideological frames of social movements and, beyond this, 
closely interlinked with and, indeed, dependent on these movements’ power of mobilisation, 
their clout in informal networks and the political impact that these endow. The issue here is 
not that they are interlinked, as it seems to be the case with all parties, nor that there is such 
an interrelationship, but rather it is the extent to which the party is merely the political arm of 
a social movement. In the Egyptian case of the MB, this link between social movement and 
party was maintained through personal influence and via the ‘pledge of allegiance’ of leading 
FJP members to the MB leadership. Most importantly, the Guidance Council used the top-
down line of command that is the backbone of the MB’s internal hierarchy to interlock itself 
with its party. To ensure that opponents did not subvert the newly established party, the 
Guidance Council ordered full members of the MB to take-up party-membership and to run 
for specific party-positions. Hence, despite the outward independence of the FJP decision-
making councils and leadership bodies, it was the ‘mother-organisation’ that approved 
candidates and encouraged their selection, thus ensuring that the MB leadership continued to 
be able to shape party policy, electoral strategies and mobilisation tactics. The implication 
here is that the FJP was an unrepresentative, undemocratic and a non-independent extension 
of the MB elite. This elite hid in the upper echelons behind the MB as an influential social 
movement organisation without being publicly accountable. The newly established party did 
not, at least not primarily, represent a voting constituency, but instead the top-down will of 
the ‘mother-organisation’ as embodied by the organisation’s Guidance Council (Trager, 
2011; Zollner, 2015, pp. 52-54). Ergo, in the case of the MB and the FJP, the boundaries 
between social movement and party were in fact fictional. The FJP acted more like a political 
arm of the MB.  
The MB/ FJP would seem to be an extreme case, but other examples of the post-Spring era 
demonstrate that this overlap between parties and movements is a common phenomenon and 
not limited to Islamists. Examples here are the ties between the Egyptian Social Democratic 
Party and the National Association for Change and later, from early 2013 onwards, the 
Tamarrod-Movement; in Tunisia, Nidaa Tounes became a melting pot, bringing together the 
ousted Bourguiba and Ben Ali elite with left-leaning movements and organisations including 
Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT). Thus, Goldstone’s theoretical observation seems to 
be correct that ‘…state institutions and parties are interpenetrated by social movements, often 
developing out of movements, in response to movements, or in close association with 
movements...’ (Goldstone, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, whether it is the case of al-Nahda, the 
MB/FJP or other new parties, there is evidence that this overlap is particularly pronounced in 
the period of democratic state-building. It throws up the fundamental issue of whether the 
interrelationship is not only part of the process of party institutionalisation and thus proof of 
healthy party life, and furthermore a sign of democratic state-building.  
Indeed, Goldstone indicates that the lack of boundaries between social movements and 
political parties signifies the transition towards a more open political system. If this is the 
case, does this mean that the lack of boundaries maps out successful democratic transition? 
Authors such as Glenn, who studies the post-communist era of democratic transition, and 
Desai, who analyses the South-Asian context, take this position (Glenn, 2003; Desai, 2003). 
However, the comparison between the MB/FJP and NM/NP challenges this position. With an 
eye on key-characteristics then, social movement activism and political party representation 
need to be kept apart to be able to assess the progression of parties’ institutionalisation. While 
the boundaries are fuzzy, the demarcation between movement and party is not only important 
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for theoretical reasons but has real implications for the process of democratic state-building. 
As social movements and political parties play different roles in political life, the equilibrium 
between the peoples’ will as expressed through a representative system on the one hand and 
the expression of political discontent against abuses of the system on the other hand can be 
easily disturbed. As we will see, relatively clear boundaries are necessary to ensure 
successful democratic state-building; while a lack of distinction between social movement 
activism and party politics jeopardises the democratic transition process. Thus, this position 
rejects Goldstone’s thesis that the fuzziness of boundaries indicates a healthy environment 
that is fundamental to democratic state-building.  
The post-Spring constellation in Egypt which showed a high degree of overlap between 
movements and parties was not a sign of successful democratisation; on the contrary, the 
level of dependency of new parties on their ‘mother-organisations’ meant that they were 
acting as an extended political arm and thus merely representing their interests. The case of 
the Egyptian MB and its FJP illustrates that the lack of boundaries can be detrimental to the 
process of democratic state-building overall. Despite concurring with the legal framework, 
the FJP was effectively run by the MB’s Guidance Council. The MB was not the only 
movement that used party politics just as an outward appearance. Parties belonging to the 
secular and left also show traits of dependency upon their mother-organisations. The 
Egyptian Social Democratic Party is an example of this which showed clear links to the 
National Association for Change, a movement that was linked to the Nobel Prize laureate 
Mohamed ElBaradei. In effect, new parties acted on behalf of a closed circle of unelected 
leaders; a religiously inspired elite as in the case of the MB, a liberal-left elite as in the case 
of ElBaradei’s National Alliance or a capitalist-right elite as in the case of Naguib Sawiri’s 
Hizb al-Masriyyin al-Ahrar (Free Egyptians Party). These elites differed in their ideological 
references but had in common that the social movement organisations they represented 
regarded the political system merely as an instrument. Thus, unelected bodies imposed their 
social and political vision by pulling strings behind the scenes but showed limited appetite for 
cross-ideological and cross-party negotiation and consent-building.  
This throws up the thesis that new party need to emancipate themselves from their ‘mother-
organisations’. Only when they no longer act as its extended political arm, is it able to seek 
‘contingent consent’ through formal political platforms (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pp. 
59-61). Contrasting Egypt’s MB with Tunisia’s NM, we can see that boundaries between 
social movements and evolving political parties are indeed important. Although NP was at 
least until 2015 formally interlinked with the NM and although the NP continues to have 
close ties to NM until today, the development of the party-side was quite advanced before the 
onset of the democratic transition process. In fact, the groundwork for NM’s aptitude to 
reinvent itself as a party was laid long before the Arab Spring, when the organisation decided 
to adopt a clear political profile and presence (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015, pp. 27-42; 
Haugbølle & Cavatorta, 2011, pp. 323-341). Its strength as a social movement was less 
framed by fundamental socio-religious change, as by its engagement as a pro-democracy 
opposition and civil society actor. The focus of Rashid al-Ghannoushi’s writings and 
speeches did not suggest that NM’s objective is the Islamisation of society. For the same 
reason, the organisation invested relatively little in building a presence in the social welfare 
sector or the area of religious da‘wa (calling). It is not to say that NM was no longer a social 
movement actor with a wider agenda of political change. But the wider social movement did 
not attempt to use its mobilising capacity to undercut formal political structures. In fact, 
NM’s social movement activities remained secondary to its attempts to enter party politics. 
As such, it was not working towards the goal of establishing an Islamic state and was not 
striving for gradual socio-religious change by attempting to Islamise society. The primary 
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emphasis of NM thus, long before the Jasmine Revolution, was on politics; social movement 
activism was secondary and directly fed into this focus. It found expression in the writings of 
Rashid al-Ghannoushi who managed to inspire the NM to be a politically moderate Islamist 
movement, despite a legal ban and draconian state repression. This configuration also 
explains why NM’s political element was well-developed once the legal ban was lifted in 
2011. The political faction of NM was the driving force on the political platform while its 
social movement segments were largely restricted and remained on the sidelined. Only in the 
post-revolutionary phase did tensions between al-Nahda as a party and al-Nahda as a 
movement appear. In early 2016, figures affiliated with the wider social movement of al-
Nahda raised concerns criticising the lack of socio-religious activism. Rather than tightening 
up relations, this confrontation led NP to formally end its ties to the religious and social 
movement activities of NM.  
With an emphasis on party politics, NP pursued its engagement for political reform through 
established institutional avenues. As such, it participated in negotiations with its political 
competition and rivals. Despite having won most seats in the first parliamentary elections, NP 
emphasised the need for cross-party consensus in constitutional negotiations and in running 
the transitional government (Bellin, 2013, pp. 5-6; Cavatorta & Merone, 2015, pp. 31-32). In 
all, its political strategy was informed by the awareness that only a broad national alliance 
with its socialist counterpart as a partner in democratic transition could pre-empt attempts by 
the political elite to reinstall a regime not dissimilar to Ben Ali’s. Although there were 
undoubtedly major differences between NP and the secular parties, the final product was one 
of negotiated compromise. Its emphasis on political negotiation through formal structures can 
be evidenced in the prolonged constitution-writing process. The NP’s commitment to the 
democratic process indicates that it acted as a representative party with the ability to reconcile 
diverging interests.  
While circumstances aided the transformation of al-Nahda from its social movement roots 
into an independent party, this development is usually not smooth. What obstructs this 
development, at least in the phase of state-building, is the fact that it allows the leadership 
elite of an influential and well-organised social movement to take part in shaping the state’s 
future while hiding behind a veneer of impartiality and democratic practice. By ensuring that 
individuals who are the preferred choice of the Guidance Council take key positions in the 
party leadership and its councils, the MB was able to circumvent intra-party and intra-
movement debates on policy-decisions, while the party was able to count on MB support for 
controversial decisions thus pre-empting any potential for intra-party rebellion. Beyond this, 
the FJP was able to rely on the MB’s political expertise and its reputation as an opposition. 
(Zollner, 2015, pp. 54-62). The MB furthermore supported the FJP through material and non-
material resources. An example of non-material resources which had a direct impact on the 
FJP’s mobilising capacity is the fact that the Guidance Council commanded MB members to 
support and campaign for the party actively. MB’s grass-roots units were mobilised during 
the election campaign, members of the MB were ‘conscripted’ to join street rallies or 
volunteered in door-to-door campaigning. The MB also provided and maintained social 
media sites and website campaigning, set up in MB offices. Of course, this gave the MB and 
its FJP an advantage over other newly created parties regarding having an impact in 
constituencies around Egypt’s urban areas. The control of the Guidance Council guaranteed 
that the FJP was perfectly positioned in preparations for the parliamentary elections of 2011. 
Thus, the election results were not only a victory for the FJP as it became the largest faction 
within parliament, but they were a triumph for the conservative MB leadership. However, the 
top-down control subsequently restricted the party’s ability to act as ‘a reconciler of interests’ 
in negotiations with opposition parties and movements, particularly with those that feared the 
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dominance of the MB. Correspondingly, the electoral defeat of parties that worked in 
opposition to the MB, such as the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, the Egyptian Freedom 
Party or the Tagammu‘, led directly to the rise of anti-Brotherhood demonstrations. As these 
parties revived their links to movements, the defeat of secular parties in the ballot boxes 
turned into battles on the street against the MB. 
On reflection, the comparison between the Egyptian and Tunisian outcomes demonstrate that 
Goldstone’s thesis needs to be qualified. His observation that the distinction between parties 
and social movements is blurred in established democracies is credible. The empirical 
evidence for Egypt and Tunisia confirms the supposition that movements and parties are even 
more indistinct during the process of democratisation. However, it is misleading to draw from 
this that the processes of democratisation must be fundamentally on course when we observe 
higher levels of overlap between social movements and subsidiary parties. In fact, it seems 
that just the opposite holds true. The case of the Tunisian NP throws up the hypothesis that 
the clearer the boundaries between a social movement as mother-organisation and its progeny 
as a political party, the more likely it is that the new party can hold to the legitimate pursuit of 
politics through formal political channels. The explanation here is that the new party acts less 
as a lobby group for the social movement in question or, as in the case of the MB in Egypt, as 
the mouth-piece of a small unelected clique. Having installed party boundaries means that it 
is more likely to act authentically as the representative of the electorate. Hence, establishing 
firm boundaries is essential for the survival of democratic transition processes.  
The transition of a social movement into a political party is not complete with the 
establishment of a political party. It is not finalised when the new party takes its seats in 
newly established institutions nor even then when it forms the new government. It is only 
absolute when (relatively) clear lines of demarcation between parties and the social 
movements from which they were delivered are established. Social movements need to 
withdraw from the formal institutional sphere and as such reverse the initial strategy that led 
them to use formal platforms to increase their influ nce and promote their agenda. In other 
words, the parties need to evolve into entities which are distinct from their social movement 
origins.   
 
Conclusion: Transition from Authoritarianism and the Process of Democratisation 
The comparison between the transition processes in Egypt and Tunisia shows that the 
numbers of newly established parties and the ideological range represented by these are poor 
indicators of whether democratic transitions are, or will ultimately be, successful. Contrary to 
common wisdom, party pluralism and political competition cannot authenticate, let alone 
assure, that democratic transition is on the right track. Data available on the range of political 
parties striving for representation in formal platforms can give us a hint as to whether 
frameworks which were previously governed by autocratic leaders are indeed open to ideas 
of democratic competition. However, to evaluate whether states are indeed experiencing a 
substantial change of direction, one needs to look more closely at the dynamics of the 
transition of social movements into political parties. This focal point calls for an investigation 
of two subsidiary issues. One deals with the institutionalisation of social movements; the 
other invites us to reflect on the boundaries which make social movements distinct from 
political parties.   
The question of the institutionalisation of social movements leads us to examine the process 
whereby social movements formalise their organisational aims, thus integrating into an 
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evolving formal state-system. As these social movements are no longer in opposition to the 
state, they become principle carriers of an evolving formal system and, in fact, shape the new 
system. There is the general assumption that the transition, both of social movements to 
parties, but also of state-systems from the ejected authoritarian regime into democratising 
frameworks, is ‘natural’ and ‘evolutionary’ (Michels, 1962; Tarrow, 1994; Offe, 1990). The 
empirical cases, however, demonstrate that the transformation from social movements to 
parties is often flawed and incomplete.  In fact, a major obstacle to successful 
democratisation occurs when the pre-existing structures of a social movement impede the 
development of the party as a sovereign construct independent of its ‘mother-organisation’. 
For the same reason, the evolving state-system which depends heavily on newly formed 
‘independent’ parties remain fragile. This paper, therefore, contends that the formation of 
boundaries in newly established parties, i.e. clear internal structures and ideational 
independence from their social movement roots are all important in determining the success 
of democratic transition. In fact, they might be useful delineators in determining distinctions 
between authoritarian systems and democratic state-building. The comparison of the Tunisian 
and Egyptian cases shows that the transition from social movement to political party 
progressed further in the case of NP than in the case of the FJP.  
Beyond the contribution made in this article, there is much room to revisit related debates. In 
particular, arguments as presented in this paper also have implications for the ‘participation-
moderation hypothesis’ in so far as both new parties, as well as social movements, need to re-
define their role as political platforms in evolving democratic systems. As the Egyptian case 
clearly shows, there is no question that social movements are an alternative to formal 
platforms of opposition in authoritarian regimes, but it must be recognised that their success 
in mobilising ‘the street’ can effectively undermine the legitimacy of new formal institutions 
during the phase of democratic state-building. Furthermore, there is no doubt that political 
parties are an essential building-block in establishing democratic systems, yet they can also 
fundamentally undermine the accomplishment of political representation. Hence, further 
research is necessary to investigate the issue of ‘moderation’ of social movements and 
political parties in the process of democratic transition. Michels and Bormeo offer opposing 
views on this matter (Michels, 1962; Bermeo, 1999).  Certainly, the fact that the MB 
persisted with its ‘radical’ vision of social change throws in question Michel’s position that 
the transition to political party leads to moderation because oligarchic elite structures have no 
interest in pursuing drastic changes. Bormeo’s position is that democratisation does not 
necessarily require that social movements and new parties sacrifice their convictions on the 
altar of democratisation. However, she does not sufficiently recognise that both social 
movements and new political parties need to aspire to establish a formal institutional 
framework. It requires reconciliation on the one hand but also demands clear boundaries on 
the other hand. Conciliation though runs contrary to the fundamental features of both social 
movements and political parties. As such, social movements are defined by their opposition 
to the system, while parties seek to maximise their power through competition within the 
system. Effectively, the transition of social movements into political parties and, parallel to 
this, the construction of a democratic state-system are processes which are prone to instability 
and failure. 
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